Communications Center Security
Barry Furey, Former
Executive Director
Knox County Emergency
Communications District, Knoxville, Tennessee
When the need to provide a secure governmental facility is mentioned, one immediately thinks of a correctional institution. While this is certainly correct, similar thought must be given to the design and protection of those buildings housing public safety communications, as this function of government must function unimpeded under all foreseeable conditions. Today’s realities also deem that this security apply not only to the facilities themselves, but also to the data and systems involved in providing these critical communications.
CALEA recognizes these requirements, and addresses them under the following communications standards:
6.4.1 Security measures for the communications center are in place to:
a. limit access to the communications center to authorized personnel;
b. protect equipment;
c. provide for back-up resources;
d. provide security for transmission lines, antennae, and power sources; and
e. provide evacuation plan, which includes the transfer of responsibilities and services to an alternate site.
6.7.1 A written directive establishes privacy and security precautions for the agency's records and, at a minimum, includes the following:
a. physical security and controlling access to agency files; and
b. procedures and criteria for the release of agency records.
and
6.8.5 The computer records and security system is inspected for access violations and improper use at least quarterly. The inspection shall include verification of all passwords or access codes.
In December 2000, the Knox County Emergency Communications District took the first step toward establishing a modern, secure facility through the purchase of a building property formerly owned by the local utility provider. Although the events of September 11th were still some months away, focus was heavily placed on security. The existing location, which had served the community well for almost fifteen years, had outgrown both space and safety needs. While situated in a politically neutral environment, it is hard to imagine that it could have been placed in a more tenuous position; it was sandwiched between a public underground parking garage and the county jail.
Working within the physical limitations employed by the utility company structure, we began the design phase with security in mind. These same principles, however, can be applied to any new facility or remodel, as well. Critical functions were identified and provided higher levels of security. This was accomplished through a combination of location, materials, and access control. Offices were laid out in order to place those with the most public access nearest to the lobby. For this reason, the personnel and records specialists were located near the front door, while the 9-1-1 center, EOC, and equipment room were placed behind additional closed locked doors.
The lobby itself provides the first interior checkpoint, and was constructed of concrete filled blocks. Ballistic-rated doors present a controlled point of access to all other areas, and the receptionist positions for both 9-1-1 and Emergency Management are protected by bulletproof glass. Bulletproof windows were also specified for the operations areas, as well, to provide personnel with a glimpse of long lacking sunlight. Prior to entering the lobby, visitors must pass through a vehicle and pedestrian gate, both of which are secured after hours. Interior and exterior cameras can be monitored throughout the facility through cable TV and local intranet. Dual servers maintain an ongoing digital record of surveillance video.
An electronic card reader system was installed that allows for complete access control. High security areas can also be password protected, and visitor cards can be set to expire at the end of the workday. The building is zoned, so that employee’s cards can be uniquely keyed to their responsibilities, with night, weekend, and holiday settings selectively “locking out” areas that may be accessible by day. Printouts are available for a number of reports, including attempts at unauthorized access. Although initially more expensive than conventional locks and keys, such systems provide the additional benefits of audit trails, long-term cost effectiveness, and improved security in high-turnover operations.
It was our intention that no less than two secured entranceways be placed between unauthorized persons and the dispatch center. This goal was accomplished, and included all emergency exits, each of which had two consecutive doors. This need to restrict access applies to all communications centers, wherever located. While our concern as a stand alone facility rested mainly with the public, centers housed in combination facilities may have to deal with both the public and detainees. Where telecommunicators serve as front desk personnel, adequate barriers must be in place to prevent the compromise of operations. Secondarily, the processing of prisoners and interview of persons of interest must be accomplished in areas far removed from critical functions. Besides the common sense aspects of these design features, NCIC and SCIC regulations may also deal with the security of these terminals.
Reliable electric power is also a requirement. In our case this is provided by two 700 KVA generators, supplied by a 5000 gallon underground tank. The tank and the power plants are located in a secured area, and properly monitored. Each generator is individually capable of supplying power to the entire facility. Dual UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supplies) filter current to electronic devices, and serve as an additional source of backup, being able to carry the 9-1-1, Emergency Operations Center, and equipment room loads for almost an hour. To afford even greater redundancy, critical components are split between the two units. In this manner, the failure of either unit disables only 50% of communications capabilities.
Redundancy also carries over to a variety of other components, as well. Separate switches supply seven digit and 9-1-1 telephony. Again, each has hot stand-by processors, and through connection to alternate UPS devices, no single point of failure can disable public access by telephone. A similar arrangement exists for CAD. In addition to the backups built into the 800 MHz trunked radio system, a stand-by trunking system was also established on a three-hundred foot tower on site. Because radio, telephone, CAD, and playback are all operated from single workstations, multiple networks are provided, as are independent backup telephone instruments.
Internet access is provided to all offices, including the 9-1-1 center supervisor’s, but not to 9-1-1 workstations. In fact, networks that carry public safety data of any kind are segregated from those that offer public access. Additional precautions are taken to secure all connections to systems housed within the facility. This is of critical concern to today’s administrators as security now encompasses both physical and electronic concerns. Protection from hacking and viruses are a must, and employees must understand the need not to load unauthorized software on any equipment. To this end, agencies are wise to consider CALEA standard 6.8.5 as a minimum requirement for security reviews, and are well served by executing more frequent inspections.
Security and redundancy, however, are not limited to the 9-1-1 center itself. Telephone lines, in particular, should take completely redundant paths from the primary telephone company central office to the facility, and should be underground, where possible. At no point, including the entrance into the 9-1-1 center, should these lines share a common point of failure, such as a pole or manhole. Where remote sites are utilized to provide radio communication, these, too, should be provided with a comparable level of support. Backup power and intrusion alarms should be considered a minimum. Fire detection and suppression is also a wise investment.
In order to be effective, all backup systems must be exercised under load on a regular basis. Additionally, procedures associated with emergency evacuations, equipment failure, and security breaches must also be regularly tested and revised. This testing should involve hands-on participation by all shifts, especially those on nights and weekends who will have to respond to such emergencies without immediate administrative support. These tests also serve as a means of regularly verifying contact numbers associated with these activities.
But no component of center security is more critical than the telecommunicator. Providing appropriate protection and establishing coherent policies are just the first step in assuring uninterrupted operation. All personnel must take individual responsibility for maintaining the security of facilities and information. Without the active participation of all employees, there can be no security.
Barry Furey is the former Executive Director of the Knox County (TN) Emergency Communications District, which has been CALEA Accredited since November 2002. He has been involved in public safety for more than 35 years, and has managed 9-1-1 centers in three states. Mr. Furey has served on or chaired numerous national public safety communications committees and currently serves as a Contributing Editor for Firehouse and is a regular management columnist for 9-1-1 Magazine.
