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EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR’S CORNER
Sylvester Daughtry, Jr. The events of September 11th tested the ability of public service agencies to deliver emergency services under the most horrific conditions. Law enforcement, fire, and other public safety personnel agree that there is often considerable confusion in the operational performance at major incidents. The ability to manage the situation effectively often seems to decrease in direct proportion to the number of agencies involved. Problems arise because of different types of agencies, operating procedures, terminology, and incompatible equipment. Jurisdictions and authority often extensively overlap, with involved agencies having difficulty determining their duties and where they fit into the operation. One significant response to this problem has been the development of a Critical Incident Command (CIC) system within public safety agencies. To consider the adequacy of CALEA’s standards in the efforts to coordinate multi-agency responses to critical incidents, a Focus Group met on January 31, 2002. After opening remarks by Chairperson Monier, four case studies were presented focusing on the role of Crisis Management and Critical Incident Command. These were:
The group then reviewed the pertinent chapters/standards in the law enforcement and communications accreditation programs. A number of general observations were made, followed by specific suggestions regarding CALEA standards. · There is a need to establish clearly defined relationships with all potential incident responders before the incident. Attendees encouraged the use of more “table-tops” and joint exercises between agencies. It was suggested that CIC systems include all of the agencies that might have a need to be present on an “unusual occurrence” scene. · A plan must be developed for establishing both outer and inner perimeters. A procedure must be established that delineates exactly who will have access to the incident site. An access control system could include ID bands, badges, colored vests and/or other credentialing. Entry and hazard exposure logs should be kept. Emergency travel routes must be kept open. · Coordination and compatibility of equipment, especially communications, is critical. · Ideally, IC systems should be used for all incidents, not just the “big ones”. · Relationships with the medical and media communities should be established in advance. · Responding agencies should consider including mental health, medical, and other social service personnel with their response units, to provide necessary assistance to those responders and victims needing it. · It is important to provide necessary protective equipment and training for operational readiness. Standards should be developed to instruct those persons on the scene as to what type of equipment should be used and that the requisite training be given to those persons. · IC should establish control of requested and non-requested volunteers. This procedure would also apply to physical items of assistance and donations such as secondary equipment, tools, food, water, and toilets. · Hazard analyses and threat assessments should be part of a community planning process. · In related issues, there is a very real need to draw a distinction between the classic “barricade situation” and an incident involving an “active assault”. · Agencies should have a system in place that allows the sharing of criminal intelligence with other concerned agencies in a timely manner. Sharing criminal intelligence has often proven to be critical to the successful deterrence of terrorist incidents. Considerations for standard changes were divided into two groups, those requiring immediate action and those that could be deferred until the upcoming periodic review of the Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies. In Jacksonville (FL), Commissioners approved for public comment a proposed CIC standard, 46.1.11, and a revision of standard 46.1.2, a plan for responding to disasters, disturbances, and unusual occurrences, along with two new glossary terms. This information has been posted on CALEA’s web site for commentary from the field with final action scheduled for CALEA’s July Conference in Cleveland, Ohio.
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